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BOOK REVIEWS
REvIEw OF UNIVERSITY Or NOTRE DAME NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE, 1950 PROCEEDINGS,

VOL. IV. Edited by Edward F. Barrett. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1951. Pp. 144. $2.00.
In addition to a brief foreword by Father Cavanaugh, President of the University
of Notre Dame, and a short introduction by the editor, this book contains five essays
as follows:
The Source of Human Rights. George E. Sokolsky
The Natural Law and the Right to Liberty. Hon. Thomas J. Brogan
The Natural Law and the Right to Property. Hon. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.
The Natural Law and the Right to Self Expression. Felix Morley
The Natural Law and the Right to Pursue Happiness. Rev. John C. Ford, S.J.
Of these, the most interesting is George Sokolsky, and the most scholarly (and
scarcely less interesting), Father Ford's. As a whole, these contributions to tho
Natura' Law are not as worthy nor as original as some of the lectures at the Notre
Dame Natural Law Institute in the years 1947, 1948 and 1949. It would, of
.course, be difficult to find in these pages, devoted to the 1950 proceedings, anything
seriously objectionable-or highly original. One should, perhaps, draw the rein
on this quest for the original. But these pages lack something. Except for a few
paragraphs in two essays, they need the stimulus and provocative explication which
would be brought to this ancient subject by a mind like, say, Maritain's. It is
not that I want a new basic doctrine, or even an entirely original presentation.
Since we are talking about something that is as old as the nature of man, and since
we know that that nature is a more profound and pregnant source of knowledge than
books can ever be, it would be silly to expect novelty of subject matter. But
there is a literary verve and a fresh perception relating to olden realities which
make them seem new.
For example, when Maritain in his forthcoming book, Creative Institution of Art
and Poetry (Bollinger Series XXXV 1, Pantheon Books, speaks of the unique communion of knowledge, he says:
"... the prime fact that is to be observed is a sort of interpenetration between Nature
and Man. This interpenetration is quite peculiar in essence: for it is in no way a mutual
absorption. Each of the two terms involved remains what it is . . . while it suffers
the contagion or impregnation of the other .... they are mysteriously commingled." 1
This is a new and imaginative way of saying what the old scholastics mean when
they refer to the spiritual identification which constitutes knowledge: "to know
is to become another, in so far as it is another."
Now, it is precisely this type of freshness which the book under consideration
mainly lacks. Many of its passages, while bearers of truth, are rather hackneyed.
Only Sokolsky manifests a really inviting style. Father Ford has one. But his
contribution was so interspersed with quotations and with scholastic jargon that
it did not successfully emerge except on occasion. Judge Brogan's derivation of the
right to liberty from the Natural Law was not particularly compelling or successful.
It is all very well to be told that something is an imperative of man's nature. B'ut
I thought Judge Brogan missed many a good opportunity to expose this necessary
1. P. 5.
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implication clearly and convincingly. His thesis was familiar and reliable. It presented no new or fascinating insights.
Some of the statements in Felix Morley's essay need qualification or explanation:
"Quakers do not subscribe to ecclesiastical distinctions, because of their profound conviction that all men are on an equal footing before God. And this is really the strongest
possible affirmation of the belief that Natural Law operates upon and is binding on
Everyman."2
I question whether all men, saints and sinners, Popes and Soviet Premiers, are
on an equal footing before God, unless it be added that "footing" here really means
their specific human nature. They are all equally human. They are all equally
men. Nor do I think that the profound conviction of Quakers could be the strongest possible affirmation of anything.
Some qualification is also needed for such statements as the following:
"Freedom of expression, even of a corrupting character, is more jealously guarded with
us than is, for instance, the freedom to advertise falsely, or to sell impure food and
deleterious drugs. . . We cling to the doctrine of caveat emptor-the buyer should
beware-especially in the field of opinion because it is so difficult to be sure that any
opinion is wholly meretricious. If it contains even a portion of truth, the suppression
of a distasteful opinion may destroy that which could be helpful to manklnd.13
Perhaps some opinions in this field are difficult to justify. I recall the somewhat
exacerbated debate, not long ago, on Graham Greene's novel, The End of the
Affair. There were priests and nuns on both sides of the question whether the
book is morally reprehensible. Perhaps, in such situations, it is reasonable to cling
to some doctrine analogous to that of caveat emptor. But it does not follow
that it is "so difficult to be sure that any opinion is wholly meretricious." This
overgeneralizes from the particular. In a literal sense, no opinion is "wholly'
meretricious, evil or erroneous. But, avoiding literalness, I think it is quite clear
that some opinions are so wholly meretricious that the doctrine of caveat emptor is
not a sufficient protection for the immature or the unwary who constitute so large
a part of the average collectivity. That is why, for all of the loose talk about
censorship and academic freedom, there are some things that we could not
and do not in good conscience or in law permit teachers to inculcate and some books
so wholly vile that they must be suppressed.
There might be a correct way of understanding the sentence: "The man who
denies the Natural Law can scarcely claim the privileges that spring from the
Natural Law, and from that source alone." 4 Yet the man who denies the Natural
Law continues to be a man, even when he is a bad man. He might dishonor his
nature. But he cannot doff it. That is why even criminals still retain some rights
under the Natural Law.
I don't follow Mr. Morley when he says:
"There is an obvious argument for permitting the Communists to talk, and to continue
the publication of the Daily Worker and their other papers. By self-expression they
tend to give themselves away, as has proved true even of some of the clever ones who
have infiltrated the Government service. That is better than driving the entire Communist movement underground. But this is a superficial argument, and does not touch
the deeper issues.
"Of far more importance is the fact that every statute which encroaches on the Right
2. P. 90.
3. P. 94.
4. P. 98.
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of Self-Expression is thereby an encroachment on the Natural Law. There is no doubt
that such encroachment may be necessary. It may even serve to bolster, prop and sup-

port the Natural Law. But, as a general rule, the greater the political regulation, the
less the spiritual development; the more men are regimented by the State, the less they

the more we depend on statutes, the less consideration we give
will discipline themselves;
to Natural Law." 5

There is much that is sane and accurately truthful about these two paragraphs.
But the truth they portray can, I think, be consigned for safer transportation to
the carriage of more careful words. Maybe the argument for permitting Communists to talk freely as Communists is obvious. Maybe the argument for silencing
them is equally obvious. Maybe much depends upon the time and the circumstances in which you silence them. Since the motives of true Communists and
the nature of what they say in their characteristic propaganda can scarcely be
defended, some circumstances might forbid suppression and other circumstances
might justify suppression. People give themselves away by other means than by
self-expression. Communists have been betraying themselves, not only by their
consistent preachments, their demagogic appeals to class-hatred, but equally by
their conduct, which historically fulfils a strategy of enslavement. The conspiracy
goes on, even though the chief conspirator who judged so many men without mercy,
has within days of this writing shuffled before the Throne of Mercy.
But it is rather strange to hear that something is better than driving the Communist movement underground. Where else has it ever been? Why else do they
need the apparatus of espionage and sabotage, lies and deceptions?
The Right of Self-Expression is not an absolute, even when Capitalized. Not
every statute which encroaches upon the Right of Self-Expression thereby and in all
circumstances affronts the Natural Law. A just law is binding in morals. A law
can be just, even when it curtails "Right of Self-Expression." The very necessity
for the encroachment might, in particular circumstances, constitute the Natural Law
justification for encroachment. Of course, it is true, as Burke pointed out years
ago, that the less man restrains himself internally by religion and momlity, the
more he involves himself in external regimentation.
Most of Father Ford's article can be summarized in his own precis:
"Now that we have had a bird's eye view of general theories of happiness, and have
investigated, superficially at least, some of the sources from which the Founding Fathers
drew their notions on happiness as the end of civil society, and the right of the Individual to pursue his own happiness, we are in a position to see where this philosophy
fits into the general tradition, and to evaluate from the viewpoint of scholasticism the
meaning of the proposition: 'Man has a natural right to pursue happiness."'o

Had he been less of a scholar and less of a theologian, he might have left matters
rest there. But he was careful to add something that demagogues constantly forget or neglect. I quote it at length, because it is the kind of reflection that ought,
more often, be called to our attention in order to avoid that temper of Utopian
irresponsibility and Pollyanna optimism which some people seem to think the
Founding Fathers enacted into Constitutional Law:
"I find it impossible to show that all men have a right to the actual attainment of this
kind of happiness on earth, for these reasons: First, there is no such absolute right
because there are Circumstances in which the observance of the moral law results in unhappiness for this or that individual. Yet the individual has no right to achieve his
5.
6.

P. 99.
P. 132.
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happiness at the expense of the moral law. Secondly, neither reason nor revelation
promises us an infallible reward of earthly happiness in return for observance of the
natural law; nor is there anything inherent in the nature of things which prevents me
from admitting that life is inevitably unhappy for many people. In fact the doctrine
of original sin and its consequences prepares us for much human misery not personally
deserved. Thirdly, human experience shows that many people who without blame on
their part, and without any injustice on the part of others, are destined to live unhappy
lives. Each one of us can think of many instances, but the example that comes to my
mind are the thousands upon thousands of mentally ill. If these sufferers have an
absolute right to actual happiness here on earth then someone is doing them a grave
injustice. Is it man? No one can point to the man. Is it God? Absit. Fourthly, we
see so much of the I-have-a-right-to-be-happy philosophy and to what it leads amongst
the heroes and heroines of fiction as well as the less heroic characters of real life, that we
cannot help but be skeptical as to the existence of any such right.
"Men are undoubtedly meant by nature to be happy. They are made for it. And if
they observe nature's laws their chances of achieving comparative happiness even in this
life are good. (But I have heard a very wise man say that there are no happy lives;
there are only happy days.) Furthermore no one will be deprived of eternal happiness
except by his own fault. But have all men a right from nature to achieve actual happiexperience, nor philosophy, nor revelation warrant the a sertion
ness on earth? Neither
7
of such a right-"
This is one of the best passages in the book. Perhaps the very best. It is one
of the excerpts which redeems this book from any charge that it is a platitudinous
repetition of what many scholastics have said so frequently and often so dully.

GODFREY P. SCHMImI

CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL AD.,NISTATIO.
By Arthur T. Vanderbilt, New York: Washington Square Publishing Corp., 1952.

Pp. 1390. $8.50.
The author is the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
He was for many years an active practising attorney, as well as a professor of
law at New York University Law School and a former dean of that law school.
His guiding genius and inspiration were important factors in the establishment of
the magnificent law school center at Washington Square, in New York City, whose
facilities are now enjoyed by the law students of New York University. He is
a former president of the American Bar Association and contributed greatly to the
formulation of our present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of Criminal Procedure.
Since his ascendancy to the bench in New Jersey, he has played the leading
role in the formulation and effectuation of a completely new set of rules of practice, which became effective September 15, 1948. Since that time, at annual judi-

cial conferences, attended by all the judges of the state and by representatives
of the legal profession from every part of New Jersey, as well as by representa-

tives of the legislature and the general public, these rules of practice have been
critically reviewed and proposed changes have been debated. As a result, the
rules have been modified and refined by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which
body has the constitutional authority under the present constitution to establish

the rules of practice for all the courts in the state.

New Jersey now enjoys the

7. Pp. 139-40.
- Lecturer in Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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benefits of a modem procedure and of an excellent judicial administration. Cases
are now speedily disposed of, the technicalities of the common law pleading have
been abolished, and the whole pattern has been changed, so that truth and justice
are the ends that are being achieved today in our New Jersey courts.
It is altogether appropriate, therefore, that the man who has played such an
important part in improving the federal procedure and in giving to his own state
of New Jersey an efficient modem procedure and judicial administration, should
produce this book. It is the kind of effort which we would expect from the author
who has given so much of his time and talents in the improvement of the law. The
book is excellent. The only unexplained fact is how he could find the time to
turn out a book of this kind in view of the many and varied activities, which crowd
his daily life.
The book itself is built essentially on the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure. The cases are, with few exceptions, decisions of the federal courts,
interpreting these federal rules. They are up-to-date, authoritative pronouncements,
well selected for their clarity, pertinency, and timeliness. Many of the cases are
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and most have been decided during the past 10 years. This follows necessarily from the fact that the present
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1937, effective in 1938,
and the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated by the
Supreme Court on December 26, 1944. The author has based his work on the
federal rules because, as he puts it, "The most effective and at the same time the
simplest system of procedure thus far developed in our law is that set forth
in the 86 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 60 Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure."' And again, "The federal rules, as the latest and the most advanced
system of procedure known to the common law, furnish a sound standard for
evaluating the procedure of the several states." 2
Before getting down to the rules and cases, the author develops, in his introduction, the importance of procedure in the work of the practising lawyer and in
the study of law; the place of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure
in the movement for judicial reform; and the major problems of procedure. This
scholarly dissertation should prove helpful to students, beginning the study of
procedure, and may be read, with much benefit, even by members of the bar.
Following this introduction, there is Chapter II which contains an article by
John H. Wigmore, entitled "The Spark Tha- Kindled The White Flame Of Progress,"
which refers to the speech by Roscoe Pound, given in 1906 before the American
Bar Association, on the topic of "Popular Dissatisfaction With Justice." Pound's
splendid exposition of the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration
of justice is printed in full. While much progress in procedure has been made
since Pound's famous speech, there is still much cause for popular dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice, in many jurisdictions.
Chapter III covers the subject matter of Jurisdiction-In What Court May The
Suit Be Brought? This topic is covered only in a very general way, without that
completeness which otherwise characterizes this book. The author recognizes this
lack, but confesses that "Space will not permit a consideration of their jurisdiction
here." 3 This chapter does contain a series of questions, the answers to which
1. P. XVII.

2. P. XVIL
3. P. 56.
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in any jurisdiction will determine whether there are the proper standards of court
organization necessary for a modem and efficient judicial administration.
The succeeding chapters follow a clear-cut and logical pattern for understanding
procedure in the federal courts. In order, the following topics are covered: (a) Who
May Sue Whom-Parties; (b) Where May Suit Be Brought-Venue And Transfer
Of Cases; (c) How To Get The Defendant Or His Property Into Court-Process;
(d) What Relief Is Sought-Remedies; (e) How To State The Controversy-The
Pleadings; (f) How to Prepare For Trial-Pretrial Procedures; (g) How To Litigate The Controversy-The Trial; (h) How To Correct Trial Errors--Judicial
Review; and (i) How To Enforce A Judgment-Execution.
Each topic is in turn subdivided into appropriate sub-divisions, which are covered
in this manner. The federal rule is first stated in full. It is followed by the
applicable cases, annotations, and comments of the author, so that anyone who
reads and understands the rule, the comment, the cases, and the annotations, should
have a thorough grasp of the particular phase of procedure being considered. There
is a completeness in the development of each phase of each topic, so that when
all of these topics have been studied in the logical sequence in which they have
been put, the student or the lawyer who wishes to improve his knowledge of procedure, particularly in the federal courts, will enjoy a feeling of intellectual satisfaction at the conclusion of his study of this book.
The book should be of great practical value to one who wants to know federal
procedure. It can be of help in any state, like New Jersey, which has modernized
its procedure by adopting rules similar to the federal rules because the interpretation of these rules by the federal courts is some indication of how the state courts
might rule in a comparable situation. It should focus the attention of thoughtful lawyers in those jurisdictions which still cling to an archaic system of judicial
administration as to how they may develop in their own states a modem procedure
that will eliminate the technicalities and delays of litigation which have so frequently
thwarted the prompt and efficient administration of justice.
From the law school viewpoint, I believe that this book would be an excellent
medium for the teaching of a course in Federal Procedure. I know that it is being
used in the two New Jersey law schools, Rutgers and Seton Hall, for students
beginning the study of the law, as part of a course devoted to an Introduction to
the Study of Law. In the hands of a competent instructor, the material in this
book can well be used to give the beginning law student that basic understanding
of the procedural side of the law, which will enable him to read and understand
in a better way the cases in his other law school subjects. It has always been
a problem for the law teacher, in dealing with first year law students, to explain
those procedural aspects of the assigned cases, which must be understood, if there
would be a complete mastery of the case itself.
There may be some difficulty in using this book, as a sole medium, in the teaching of a course in Civil Practice of a particular state. Thus, in my course in
New Jersey Practice, which is limited to 60 hours, and in which I deem it essential
to develop as fully as time will permit the court system and the particular rules
of practice, peculiar to New Jersey, it would be necessary to use this book in a
supplementary manner. Certain selected cases might be assigned to illustrate the
New Jersey rule. The discussion of a particular case produces interest and vitality,
which a mere lecture on a rule of practice cannot produce as effectively.
The book is topped off by 200 pages of most interesting reading materials which
cover such important items necessary to the due administration of justice as:

116
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(a) The Judicial Selection And Related Problems; (b) Jury Selection And Service;
(c) The Legal Profession; (d) Judicial Administration; (e) Maitland's "The Forms
of Action at Common Law"; and (f) excerpts from the introduction to Langdell's
"A Summary of Equity Pleading." All of this gives that complete coverage, which
will enable the teacher of the law to impart to the student of the law a knowledge
of modem procedure and judicial administration and the desire to improve the
procedural side of the law in his own jurisdiction, so that truth and justice may
prevail.
VICOR S.

t

Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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